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| J E P - Number 25 - 2007/2 |
| The Virtual Ego and the Cyborg André Nusselder |
Keywords: Body - Imaginary - (Cyber)space - New Media - Lacan Summary: By combining the terms 'cybernetics' and 'organism' NASA scientist Manfred Clynes coined in 1960 the word 'cyborg'. Whereas this initially referred to a human being whose bodily functions were aided or controlled by technological devices, nowadays the term has acquired a more general meaning and describes the dependence of human beings on technology, so that we can think that all who enter cyberspace become cyborgs because they depend on machines for their online life (Jordan, 1999). The question of space is pivotal: how do we inhabit virtual spaces? In this paper I use the theory of Lacan to address the question of space. For Lacan this question is a profound psychological issue: we (psychically) exist in space, and this existence is not without physical attachment. The function of the ego and the body in the opening up of space should shed some light on bodily involvement in (cyber) space. From there the question of the cyborg, and the opportunities and risks of becoming one, should become apparent. 1. The body in space 1.1. The conception of space: physical, psychological What constitutes space is not an open-and-shut case; there are various conceptions of space (cf. Wertheim, 1999, 33). Since the rise of modern science the physical conception of space dominates, wherein space is a boundless extension that contains everything, as a dimension of the world that is independent of bodies, like the space on my bookshelf: it is there, whether it is packed with books or not. In this absolute space of Newtonian physics space is a logically and ontologically independent dimension. This view is so entrenched in ordinary usage that we normally regard it as the primary meaning of space from which all others are derived. Space as an all-encompassing container is without reference whatsoever to sense perception. Leibnizian relationalism as another major paradigm in the modern conception of space does not consider space to be an absolute and infinite substance, as does the tradition reaching its culmination in Newtonian physics (Copernicus, Kepler, Galilei, Descartes). Leibniz conceives space as a purely relational system or mathematical structure (Torretti, 1998, 61). The situation, distance or relation of one body towards another defines a thing's place; it does not have a fixed place in a scientific system of coordinates. Space, according to Leibniz, is that what encompasses all those places. It does not have a genuine reality of its own. George Berkeley's epistemological idealism takes Leibnizian relationalism to its extreme. When there is no space without bodies, then space as such is mere nothing. As Berkeley denies the existence of material, real things outside our perception, space results not from the relations between things, but from the projection of representations that God impresses in our mind. The physical conception of space unties it from sense perception. Since it is perpetually present it is absolute, not dependant on the perceptions of a human subject. Space does not have such an absolute status in a psychological conception. As tied to sense perception, psychological space can change. The use of drugs, for instance, can change the experience of space in such a way that someone may jump off a building by losing his sense of distance. Although Lacan also mentions “the objective space of reality,” he focuses on the bipolar character of “the space in which the imagery of the ego develops” (Lacan, 1977, 27). Man's narcissistic doubling of reality is crucial to the psychological analysis of space: “The notion of the role of spatial symmetry in man’s narcissistic structure is essential in the establishment of the bases of a psychological analysis of space” (Lacan, 1977, 27). Space reflects all sorts of figures of ourselves, and it makes us question whether cyberspace is not a whole realm full of technological mirrors. 1.2. Mirror space: the ego as a virtual unity simply because it is an image, the ego is an ideal ego … The subject will discover over and over again that this image of self is the very framework of his categories, of his apprehension of the world – of the object. (Lacan, 1988, 282) We can perceive a branch and see a stick in it. Pierre Lévy considers the fact that man "sees double" as the basis of technology. The exchange between ourselves and the real entities that we perceive, virtualizes the real by doubling it. (Lévy, 1998, 116-7). Lévy stresses the concurrence of man's capacity for creating technological artifacts and his capacity for creating a second world: no technology without imagination. Imagination is constitutive of (technological) reality itself. From a Lacanian perspective one might come to similar conclusions, for Lacan holds that even our sense of personal identity comes about via a doubling of the real. The "me" is not present in an immature form from birth onwards, only having to reach full maturity, as a tree is the mature form of the core that was already present in the seed. Lacan follows Freud's basic notion that the ego is something that must be developed ("Das Ich muss entwickelt werden"). According to Lacan, imagination is a medium through which even we ourselves always exist as a virtual double. He formulates this constitutive relationship between the organism and its double for the first time in his famous theory of the mirror stage. Its pivotal notion concerns the identification with the specular image as furnishing the self with a virtual unity. The entire dialectic which I gave you as an example under the name of the mirror stage is based on the relation between, on the one hand, a certain level of tendencies which are experienced let us say, for the moment, at a certain point of life – as disconnected, discordant, in pieces – and there’s always something of that that remains – and on the other hand, a unity with which it is merged and paired. It is in this unity that the subject knows himself for the first times as a unity, but as an alienated, virtual unity. (Lacan, 1988a, 50) The mirror stage is the paradigmatic structure of the imaginary. All identifications with images establish a sense of unity, mastery or autonomy that is not there in the real. As constitutive elements of our personal identity, these illusions permeate our reality with virtuality. We recognize ourselves in a complete form in the mirror image, or reflection: "The human being only sees his form materialised, whole, the mirage of himself, outside of himself" (S.1, 140). We can gain consciousness of ourselves in all sorts of things in which we can recognize ourselves: works of art, of philosophy, manual works, consumer goods, instruments, machines, displays … : they give a concrete form to, they design, our desire. Likewise, we can gain self-identity in products of digital technologies. The computer screen as well functions as a mirror. For Rob Shields the image-circuits of digital culture have become the mirrors in which to look for an identity (Shields, 1997). Technological images can provide a sense of personal identity because we can find (images of) ourselves in them. We identify with the image on the screen as such a mirror. The computer is a medium for man, to use the words of Lacan, "to impress his image in reality": we find self-images in it and (try to) shape the world accordingly. The point to be remembered here is that consciousness is a matter of surface-appearances. In presenting the outside of ourselves, we make (up) our identity and become conscious of ourselves (self-conscious, self-confident – as with make-up – or even self-assured). Make-up and fashion are the most obvious examples of this intricacy of personal identity and surface-presence. In a broader context this allows for the interpretation of design as the skin of culture (De Kerckhove, 1997). 1.3. The body as a projection of surface-appearances The constitutive imaginary function of the subject opens up space. The subjective projection of the self as an image-object differs from the real self'. Therefore an original, bodily investment works in the identification processes that make us "inhabit" the world. In his discussion of the identification with a surface-image, or virtual image, Lacan refers to a much discussed passage from Freud’s "The Ego and the Id": “The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface,” elaborated by the footnote: “I.e., the ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly those springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body.” (Freud, 1923, 25-6). Lacan's theory of the mirror stage upholds this Freudian notion of an ego coming into being via identification with the mental image of its body or bodily sensations. The imaginary function constitutes a psychical reality perceived as objective ("I see myself as" a constitutive difference or distance between the original I and its reflected figures). But this objective space (of self-representation) cannot do without the libidinal, narcissistic investment in images that differ from the unreflected I (at the bodily level). When we regard fantasy as equal to the imaginary function, as is the case for the early Lacan where the narcissistic matrix of the mirror stage gives Lacan's first paradigm of fantasy (cf. Miller, 1999, 10; Ribettes, 1984, 189) then it has both a subjective and an objective status (without being either completely subjective or objective): it is objective-subjective. Fantasy as what is necessary for time-space distanciation, opens up the objective space of the world we live in, but simultaneously introduces a subjective (bodily) aspect to it. Therefore there is no objective space of self-representation. The word "space" is derived from the Latin word spatium, meaning "race-track," or generally "distance," "interval," "terrain" (Torretti, 1998, 59). A difference or distance between the real and the imaginary is necessary for the coherent appearance of reality. One way to conceive the real (not: reality) is as a chaotic multiplicity of immediate sense impressions or bodily feelings that needs synthetization (in imaginary space) in order to make sense. The Lacanian understanding of space as a modus of the imaginary is very similar to Kant's. In Lacanian theory, space as equivalent to distance or difference also implies a (psychological) distanciation from the original symbiotic unity (mother-child" in order to have space for one's own identity; one must withdraw from the real of a primitive jouissance. An empty space or distanciation (the emptiness of the desiring subject) is therefore necessary for the sound functioning of a human being. Since the mirror stage is the paradigmatic structure of the imaginary, all forms that we give to ourselves express a binding or unification of libidinal energies. From a psychoanalytical perspective such knots of libido are the nuts and bolts of man's reality. The decisive notion hitching Lacan’s theory of identity firmly to its Freudian origins concerns the images that produce consciousness as thoroughly invested by libido. In his seminar on the formations of the unconscious (1957-58) Lacan states that “the image has that property of being a captivating signal that isolates itself in reality, that attracts and captures a certain libido of the subject, a certain instinct, due to which a certain number of identifying marks, of psychoanalytical points in the world, permit the living being to organize his behavior” (Lacan, 1998, 225; my translation). 1.4. Interfacing man and world The imaginary order thus introduces a distinction between the Inside and the Outside of the subject; severing the here from the there, it opens up space. It causes duplication, producing the lived inner body and the body-surface. The imaginary order both separates the "organism" and his environment (and hence constitutes individual consciousness) and connects the individual to his world. This imaginary space (of fantasy) hence functions as an interface between man and world. Man is caught up in a delicate situation, since he has no stable reality that he can or must adapt to. There is no true form (or real possibility) for him to realize. Man is decentered, simultaneously in real and virtual space. Therefore his perception of the real is already virtualized by the constructive function of images putting the real in virtual space. Normally, the imaginary space of fantasy mediates the real and the virtual; its limits consist of the real (of pain) and the virtual (of narcissistic illusions). Sandy Stone brings this field forward as the "framing events" of the psychical reality of prosthetic reality, within whose boundaries all perception and emotion occur (cf. Stone, 1995, 396). The analysis of the role of the imaginary shows that we always camouflage the real, and (try to) deceive others and ourselves. There is no human reality without this play of seduction. The paradox of the computer interface is that it must always present the data-objects in a perceivable and recognizable form: data-objects, applications and user meet at the user-interface. Data, computer hard- and software and the wetware of the human organism encounter each other. Hence the user cannot see anything in the data of the information codes without inserting his self-image into the scene they describe. Since the fantasmatic capacity of the mind functions as a medium taking us to a place other than where we actually (think we) are, telepresence, the sense of transportation to any space created by media (cf. Biocca, 1997, § 5.3), belongs to the human condition itself. The phenomenon of telepresence is thereby incorporated into new technological forms. The computer interface facilitates this sense of transportation and therefore also functions as an inter-space: it binds the physical space and the virtual spaces that we already knew of (by means of texts, speaking, reading, imagination, films etc) to the new technological forms of virtual space. New interfaces open up new space-time systems. New technologies like the mobile phone, the Internet and Virtual Reality lead to new avatars (or Gestalts) of the self, and therefore arouse fascination and excitement. They provide new, fascinating images of ourselves by synthesizing new, different (real) sensations within a new virtual world. The sensation of hearing a material thing like a voice coming out of a phone-box, hearing this real object from a far away place, leads to new formations and a different positioning of oneself. So what fascinates us in digital media is their capacity to create new Gestalts out of discontinuities and heterogeneities (such as the morphing of different people into one Gestalt, as in Michael Jackson's video clip "Black or White"). Media theoretician Lev Manovich makes the claim that new media replace the old media of montage with an "aesthetics of continuity" in which compositing is the central element; it blends the different elements "into a seamless whole, a single Gestalt" (Manovich, 2001, 144). Thus we can create simulations of impossible surroundings that appear more realistic than filmic representations. These new forms of montage very often have no other intention than to arouse fascination or esthetic pleasure (cf. Simons, 2002, 113). 1.5. Fascination: the double bind of occupying virtual space The jubilation of the infant on seeing his reflection in the mirror stage is a celebration of the control of its own body. Similarly, feelings of (an anticipated) mastery or control in general are expressed in certain dispositions or states of mind. Fascination is one of those decisive dispositions in which man constructs himself as a virtual double: it absorbs or engages him in the image. A crucial insight therefore bears upon the construction of a human, virtualized reality as always occurring via such experiences of fascination and hypnotization integrating new sensations into a new sense of self. Fascination and the hypnotic effect of the image are pivotal for virtual reality. Fascination is absolutely essential to the phenomenon of the constitution of the ego. The uncoordinated, incoherent diversity of the primitive fragmentation gains its unity in so far as it is fascinated. Reflection is also fascination, jamming. (Lacan, 1988a, 50) The tricky thing about fascination is that it lures us. As Lacan's theory of the mirror image clarifies, fascination implies an (unconscious) absorption in something (a virtual image) that the subject itself is not (in the real). The object of desire is not our own in fascination but actually the object of desire of the other, although the desire appears to be our own desire (we want to be like the fascinating other, we want what he wants). In fascination we identify with something that we are not: alienation. In his psychoanalytic approach to the (film) screen, semiotist Christian Metz reveals that in order for fascination to occur the images on the screen must appear as the expression of the desire of the spectator (cf. Sarup, 1992, 153). Since Lacan unravels desire as the desire of the other, the lure is an inevitable aspect of human reality (fantasy as a constitutive aspect of reality). We never get directly to the real; the real is always fantasmatically mediated. In immersive Virtual Reality (VR) the computer synthesizes the diverse sense-stimuli of the body of the user into a coherent self-image of the user. As it generates a self-image that we not only look at but also actually live in, it is one of the most fascinating media experiences available: we act through that image; we step inside the computer-generated avatar. Hence it is also the most extreme example of how the computer can take over the synthesizing role of the human subject. As media scientist Ken Hillis points out, the impression that Virtual Reality offers an experience of unmediated sensation, called "direct perception" by Virtual Reality designers, is false." According to Hillis Virtual Reality is in fact a highly mediated series of conceptions or ideas, of military, commercial, scientific interests along with those of the software designers who interpret these conceptions and write the programs (Hillis, 1999, 69-70). Too much fascination may make us forget the composition (compositing) of the object that attracts us. So, it remains a matter of not taking the fascinating fantasy image for reality itself. Hence Ken Hillis reproaches Jaron Lanier's notion of post-symbolic communication: a house in virtual reality is not a representation of a house but is actually a house. Thinking in this vein falls into the trap off assuming that virtual reality can realize our nostalgic desire and get to the true form of the real (thus leaving all the troubles of the real behind). Such utopian thinking, according to Hillis, may take root during exploitation to justify social inequality. What we must not forget is that "direct perception" is not reality itself but still a framing of reality. "Lanier himself has forgotten the screen, if not the frame" (Hillis, 1999, 193). When we forget this framing, the screen turns into a mirror. A full absorption in the world of ideal images provided by the media makes the creative process of subjectivation disappear, and we risk losing ourselves. That is to say that alienation, which is a constitutive dimension, becomes total because we no longer recognize the tension between the ideal image (that we are not) and the real that escapes it: plastic surgery disasters as the excess of make-up. When fascination dissolves this tension, creative disclosure turns into enclosure. The image must remain a promise. 2. Cyberspace, cyberbodies 2.1. Narcosis and the promise of relief In the chapter of his Understanding Media called "The Gadget Lover: Narcissus as Narcosis," Marshall McLuhan refers to the figure of Narcissus to evoke the notion of the mirror-like extension of man. If Lacanian theory shows that all sorts of things can function as a mirror, McLuhan elaborates technology as such a mirror: the principle of "self-amputation" or relief is at the origin of the media of communication, from speech to computer (McLuhan, 1994, 43). Basing himself on medical research, McLuhan explains the origin of media from the physiological inadequacy of the central nervous system to deal with all the stimuli that are coming from the outside world. Put in a Kantian-Lacanian way, media are thus necessary instruments to synthesize the multiple stimuli of the senses. Media as extensions or amputations of bodily functions are a means to maintain a sensory equilibrium (stimuli regulation). They have a protective function. Although a broad line in the philosophy of technology considers technology to be a means to compensate for bodily shortcomings, McLuhan’s reference to Narcissus links this explicitly to unconscious phenomena like fascination, self-protection and self-exteriorization. In line with this psychological approach to technology, media theorist Peter Weibel therefore describes all technology as psycho-technology, manners to cancel the (sense of) loss: Technology helps to fill, to bridge, to overcome the insufficiency emerging from absence. Every form of technology is teletechnology and serves to overcome spatial and temporal distance. However, this victory over distance and time is only a phenomenological aspect of the (tele-) media. The real effect of the media lies in overcoming the mental disturbances (fears, control mechanisms, castration complexes, etc.) caused by distance and time, by all forms of absence, leave, separation, disappearance, interruption, withdrawal or loss. By overcoming or shutting off the negative horizon of absence, the technical media become technologies of care and presence. By visualizing the absent, making it symbolically present, the media also transform the damaging consequences of absence into pleasant ones. (Weibel, 1992, 75) Psychologist, systems analyst and philosopher Raymond Barglow stresses the defensive functions of the computer: it compensates for our dependency and vulnerability by objectificying our surroundings, thus rendering the world relatively predictable and manipulable and emotionally safe (Barglow, 1994, p. 128). And Turkle considers the promise of self-control a crucial aspect of man's attraction to computers: it offers an environment for a new level of control and mastery and thus becomes a key player in this kind of drama (Turkle, 1995, p. 274). Others stress that the functioning of fantasmatic images is actually the basic motivation of science (cf. Bergoffen, 1995, p.575), and of technology with the promises of mastery, power, pleasure, plenty, and self-actualization (cf. Markley, 1996, p. 73). Media have the power to hypnotize us and to make us forget our own deficiencies: they numb the senses that cannot cope with all the stimuli. Or, more broadly, they numb the awareness of our own inadequacies and defects because of the fascinating image they depict of us: according to Richard Veryard we repress technology itself because we do not want to see how alike we have become to our machines, that our ideas and perceptions are not our own (Veryard, 2000). From a Lacanian perspective, the numbing of our senses is not necessarily a malicious process. For we exist (as subjects of desire) in a tension between the immediacy of sensations and its objectification in the ego: “The ego really is an object. The ego … is precisely what the immediacy of sensation is in tension with” (Lacan, 1988a, p.49-50). For Lacan a (genetic) physiological deficiency is the root cause of the objectification of the ego: the prematurity of human birth and the defenselessness of the newborn infant. In a structural sense this is a disruption of man’s "natural" relation to the outside world (Lacan, 1977, p.4). An inner tension between inadequacy and anticipation characterizes man’s imaginary relation to the outside world. Imaginary forms supplement the real and function as a window upon man himself and his world, which is not far from the conception of man as a cyborg. Cyborg technologies materialize this window in technological artifacts that try to restore, normalize, reconfigure or enhance the human being, the four types of cyborg technologies categorized by Gray, Mentor & Figueroa-Sarriera in their capital work on the cyborg (1995, p.3). To give some examples: we supplement our bodily functions with artificial organs and limbs, glasses and pacemakers; almost everyone of us is reprogrammed (immunized) to resist disease, and psychopharmacological drugs are generally used to feel or behave better. "Narcosis as (Second) Nature," to paraphrase McLuhan. As human beings trying to restore, normalize, reconfigure and enhance our physical and psychical inadequacies by way of a screen of constitutive and idealizing images, we ("cyborgs") exist in the order of promise. Though we are cyborgs always supplementing our vulnerable identity, compensation does not lie on the road of illusions taking us away from our true self." The promises of an ideal reality held forth by science and technology belong to human reality itself. Actually, these promises sustain (psychologically) the whole enterprise and lead man towards new discoveries. 2.2. Avatars: the virtual body In Hinduism avatars are the descent, incarnation or embodiment of the goddess. By extension, the term concerns the changing states someone lives through. Both online forms of self-representation ("personae") and (anterior) forms of the self in Lacanian theory (I see myself as …, I think of myself as …, I idealize myself as …) can be considered avatars. We can play with these forms, reshape and reform them in virtual space (the space of – symbolic – representation). It is for that reason that Sherry Turkle can draw a parallel between online personae and the self emerging in a psychoanalytic encounter: both are significantly virtual, either constructed within the space of analysis or in the virtual space of online role-playing communities (cf. Turkle, 1995, p.256). An avatar in a virtual world may give a unified form to tendencies otherwise experienced as discordant and disturbing, like the identification with the virtual image in Lacan's theory of the mirror stage. By picking an avatar (erotic, aggressive, animal-like …) I can formalize certain tendencies that remain otherwise dark and obscure. Lacan's point, however, is that the unconscious is not this dark and obscure inside of the self, but only comes to being in the externalization. It is only in the form of, for instance, an avatar that I can come to recognize my unconscious intentions; they do not exist as such before their materialization. Therefore, the unconscious "happens" at the interface. Bringing unconscious things into an intersubjective dimension makes them manageable. This is the basis of psychoanalytic psychotherapy. And such a process also take place in a virtual environment where, as cyber-therapy researcher John Suler explains, avatars (or "props") function as masks that both hide and reveal aspects of someone's personality, mostly without the person being immediately aware of this (Suler, 1999). One must stress, from a Lacanian point of view, that the virtual mask does not hide or reveal a present being behind the mask. The mask itself reveals being: what I am does not exist in its true form behind the imaginary form. Behind the mask is nothing but the real of chaotic tendencies. The ego as the instance of personal identity is thus a (necessary) virtual unity hiding the real of chaotic tendencies, and the non-existence or emptiness of the true Self. The unity of the Self is, as Lacan stated, an alienated unity. Therefore the frequently heard objection against a "life on the screen" as being non-real or alienated cannot hold out. For we are always already alienated. John Suler developed a game in which people in a virtual environment on the Internet take turns standing before a group and trying a few of their favorite avatars. The rest of the group then tosses out ideas, by freely associating to the image, about the psychological connotations of the avatars. Most of the case clarified a lot about the owner of the avatar. People may simply say that they are wearing a particular avatar because "I like it.," and when asked they're not sure what it says about them, but other people may know (Suler, 1999). Although the Other thus (also) determines the Self, this does not imply—from a Lacanian perspective—that the others know the unconscious meaning of a visual expression and the person in question himself does not. Then the others are like a "subject supposed to know," a fixed fantasy of the therapist as an omniscient being. Lacan stresses that the analyst is not omniscient, although analysis often brings out such fantasies. Psychoanalysis is not about such a hierarchic relationship. It concerns the mutual exploration of the unconscious, as it exists, for instance, in the medium of images. New technologies could add new media for the exploration of the unconscious (instead of drawings, visualizations in virtual environments), and Suler considers the possibility of an avatar psychotherapy: an exploration of the client's healthy and problematic identities by exploring its manifestations within imaginary scenarios (Suler, 1999a). In order to speak of "cyberbodies," one thus must add the element of technological construction to the aspects of imaginary and symbolic production of our (bodily) self. Such a cyberbody is a "new social imaginary, where the body is reconfigured through a complex mix of image, culture, and technology" (Kennedy, 2000, p.474). Avatars illustrate the constitutive psychological factor in the construction of (virtualized) reality. We can experience a virtual community as just another way of socializing because—as in normal reality—we can project our sense of identity on it. Avatars can materialize or visualize the sense of self. Avatars are only the most obvious examples of how we recognize ourselves in the technological mirror, for all sorts of virtual environments, agents and informational systems can function as alter egos (cf. Vasseleu, 2002, pp.86-88). Because we invest ourselves in virtual environments as alter egos, being in a virtual world is not some sort of disembodied presence (as in the conception: "in cyberspace the mind leaves the body"). It actually has a material, embodied foundation. I conceive this material cause of presence, in accord with Freudian theory, as the sensations that occur at the surface of the body. Their mental projection is the image of the body that we call the ego. 2.3. Emotional avatars The (spatial) differentiation between the body as organism and the body as image constitutes the ego as a necessary alienation from the direct sensory sensations. That is the lesson we can draw from Lacan's theory of the imaginary. The imaginary ego retains strong elements of illusion and lure, but it has powerful effects. It virtualizes our direct sensations by making our awareness of them an effect of the imaginary. That’s why someone may experience a small slap of the hand as extremely painful. It might also explain why a fakir can endure an extreme sensation like lying on a bed of nails: namely by extinguishing his ego. This topic of consciousness as an effect of surface-appearances (images) becomes highly interesting for our analysis of the interface when we relate it to the issue of emotions. The study of emotions is a very old one and resolves around the question whether emotions come first, followed by the (cognitive, intellectual) labeling and the actions it evokes. Or the action occurs first, and is subsequently interpreted as a certain emotion ("I fled from this situation, so I must have been frightened"). According to Lacanian theory, one must pose emotions as an imaginary affair: they are surface-appearances. We only identify certain sensations as a specific emotion by representing them in a certain way (imagining them). This repudiates the existence of real emotions: all emotions are an effect of representation. Emotions are outside, exterior, on the surface. In this sense, Lacanian theory agrees with Merleau-Ponty who argued in his 1945 essay "The Film and the New Psychology" that emotions are types of behavior or styles of conduct which are visible from the outside, not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of another's consciousness. As performance artist Stelarc states, "In the end, you are determining emotional levels simply through the way you express yourself and your mode of behavior" (Stelarc, in Scheer, 2002, p.90). This insight does not necessarily mean that emotions are merely superficial. Emotions do have a real effect: I really must cry when I feel miserable. The point is that they do not have a pure (that is: immediate), real cause. Although they may touch on the essential, they do not do so without mediation. In this sense I agree with a conclusion drawn out of one of the works of Stelarc in which he enacts (e)motions through cybernetic systems. His "Movatar" is a metal jacket avatar whose motions a computer model maps via electronic muscle stimulation onto Stelarc's physical body. The "Movatar" moves him, and he in turn can modulate the motions of the avatar so that a cybernetic loop occurs. A theorist concludes, analogously, that even if emotion is virtual, it can best be described as grounded virtuality that is linked to the substantial, although maybe not the essential (Scheer, 2002, p.94). What causes the emotions to appear is significantly mediated by the imaginary ("avatars") so that we can only recognize them at the surface. This fits within a theory of emotions as mediated by imagination and intentions. Consider, for instance, that one cries much sooner when one imagines oneself to be in a miserable situation, or to be very pitiful. One must situate this seemingly inhuman understanding of emotions against the background of anxiety, the affectivity which is the principle concern during psychoanalysis. It is anxiety, in its many forms, against which people set up all kinds of defense mechanisms that psychoanalysis studies. For Lacan anxiety is the only affect that is real, the only affect with a real cause. Only anxiety is not deceptive and therefore, as he argues in his 1962-3 seminar Anxiety, it is not an emotion. From this perspective it is hard to maintain that emotions play no role in interaction of humans and computers, which is the (romantic) argument often used to distinguish human-computer interaction from face-to-face interaction (cf. Turkle, 1995, p.84). Reeves and Nash's "Media Equation" thesis shows that people respond to computers and mediated worlds as if they were humans. People attribute personalities and gender stereotypes to computers, and respond to automated flattery as if it came from humans, etc. Since emotions are a matter of expression, and not of a real affectivity, computers do not possess emotions, but they can evoke emotions in us and thereby make us believe that there are emotions involved in the technological interface with reality: we imagine them. Rosalind Picard, founder and director of the Affective Computing Research team at M.I.T.'s Media Laboratory, shares these conclusions. In her essay on computers and emotions, she holds that computers can recognize and evoke emotions, yet not "have" them (Picard, 1997). Affective computing is an interesting area for the topic of "machinic emotionality" or cyborg emotions. For instance in the development of "Affective Avatars," information about the users' physiology is registered (by a full-face mask) and represented in the expressive graphical interface of the avatar, which greatly improves the possibilities of physical and emotional presence. Affective avatars elucidate emotional presence as a matter of representation. The imaginary as a doubling of reality has strong impacts as a luring dimension. When we question the difference between man and computer, we should not seek the decisive criteria at the level of emotions and feelings. For beings of communication and representation like us, emotions are not the real, substantial criteria. The interaction with a simulated or machinic other also evokes emotional presence: we feel emotions and attribute emotions to the machine. Emotions are therefore rather like performances, mimetic operations. 2.4. The precarious balance of the Narcotic Organism There is a danger attached to the mechanisms determining consciousness and emotions as (to a large extent) a matter of images, particularly so in cyborg forms of communication. Affective avatars illustrate that when surface representations of sensations are so decisive for emotional experience, a situation could arise of a cyborg-self fully trying to control its sensations and affects (as the cause of anxiety) by rationalizing its appearance. This may happen, for instance, to the subjects of Rational Emotive Therapy (RET: irrational thoughts and beliefs determine emotions, and we must therefore rationalize those beliefs). Kevin Robins and Les Levidow describe such a functioning of information technologies in the development of warfare, where fear and anxiety is converted into perceptions of external threat, killing is done at a distance without the shock of direct confrontation, and victims become targeted things on the screen not implicated in a moral relationship (Robins & Levidow, 1995, p.120). Information technologies may affect the (normal, social, moral) relationship between self and other by objectifying defenses into an electronic shield. The screen of fantasy then becomes impenetrable armour. In video games as well, the players, thus Robins and Levidow, are constantly defending themselves or even the entire universe from destructive forces. The play is a compulsive, pleasurable repetition of a life-and-death performance wherein the player's anxiety can never be finally mastered, so that he engages in a characteristic repetition, often described as "video game addiction" (Robins & Levidow, 1995, p.122). Technological possibilities can seduce us to such an extent that we imagine the constraints of the real being eliminated (the addict who only lives online – the realized fantasy). Problems arise when we imagine fulfilling the promises belonging to existence itself technologically; when we think that psychopharmacology is the solution to each and every psychic problem; when people get addicted to their life on the screen because they feel so much better there than in real life. Then we fall into the trap of thinking about technologies in terms of hyperrealisation: the virtual that fully supplements the deficiencies of the real. Lacanian theory acknowledges these excessive narcotic capacities of media and technologies. There is continuity between the self-preserving necessity of the ego and its excessive and narcissistic aspirations. Lacan esteems a psychological truth “the extent to which the so-called ‘instinct of self-preservation’ deflects into the vertigo of the domination of space” (Lacan, 1977, p.28). In an extraordinary and gloomy digression (tapered here to the thought of physicists, perhaps nuclear physicists) Lacan asks himself whether this will of the ego to realize space, to eliminate all otherness, does not inevitably lead to catastrophes. “Thus, by extending our grasp to the confines of matter, will not this ‘realized’ space … vanish in its turn in a roar of the universal ground? … war is proving more and more to be the inevitable and necessary midwife of all progress in our organization” (Lacan, 1977, p. 27). The will to realize space by reducing it to human formations (reducing it to imaginary space) inevitably has destructive consequences. Here again we discover the logic of Heidegger's "Age of the World Picture": the (modern) desire to fully imagine the world on the (computer) screen is imperative for the way objects should appear, namely as calculable (or to update this: as computable) things. The will to dominate and control space: thus Lacan characterizes the ego. Teresa Brennan uses Lacanian theory to designate twentieth century Western culture as an age of paranoia, wherein projected aggressive desires toward the other make the ego believe that the objectified other is out to get it; the projections make the ego anxious and therefore eager to control (Brennan, 1993). The sense of menace and (imaginary) objectification conspire. The more we try to objectify the other, the more intimidating he becomes. The bigger the desire for control is, the bigger the threat is felt that results from its failure. To the extent that the sense of self is a matter of images of one's own body, Lacan points out, what is feared most is everything which could potentially injure the body's boundaries. At the end of his text on the intimacy of the relation between aggressiveness and the imaginary order, Lacan draws various psychological conclusions out of the pivotal role of the body image in the experience of our self. For instance “the extent to which the fear of death, the ‘absolute Master’, presupposed in consciousness by a whole philosophical tradition from Hegel onwards, is psychologically subordinate to the narcissistic fear of damage to one’s own body” (Lacan, 1977, p.28). We fear the invasion or violation of our proper (bodily) domain because that may cause what we try most to keep at a (narcissistic) distance: anxiety. The myth of Narcissus illustrates that the will to be similar to the image and to eliminate the tension caused by the 'real self' can lead to self-destruction: Narcissus drowns. Lacan elaborates this aggressive trait of narcissism into the notion of "narcissistic suicidal aggression" (Lacan, 1966, p.174, p.187). In it, the subject tries to resolve the aggressive tension caused by the discrepancy between its (limited) self and its (ideal) image by directing the aggression against the (real) being that does not correspond to the image. Similar aggression is an ever-present risk among the possibilities of the cyborg. According to Robins and Levidow this duplicity of narcissistic identification defines the paranoid rationality of the cyborg – the duplicity of both omnipotent control and the fear of being affected, attacked or injured: "The cyborg self phantasizes about controlling the world, freezing historical forces, and, if necessary, even destroying them in rage; it contains its anxiety in the name of maintaining rational control" (Robins & Levidow, 1995, 119). The technological interface with reality functions as a screen towards the real as an object of anxiety, as the disturbing limitations of our bodily unity. In The Culture of Narcissism (1979) historian and social critic Christopher Lasch teaches that pathological or secondary narcissism has more to do with self-hatred than with self-love: it functions as a defense against aggressive impulses and anxiety. The ego, as the result of the projection of bodily sensations into a mental self-image, can evolve into a pathological entity trying to enclose itself in its image. It can cut off the ties with everything (the real) that poses a limit to its narcissism and that calls for an awareness that not everything is possible. Technologies function as such an extension or expansion of the ego, enlarging the psychological distance to the real (other). So the self that emerges from the identification with screen-images (the hyper-rational self of RET, the self of online communication, the self of the cyborg soldier …) can be extremely harsh: controlling the affect, flaming and aggressive acting out, killing without the shock of direct confrontation. Conclusion The ego's habitation of the virtual (subjective) space opened up by the mirror image is complicated and tense. Virtual space, the duplication of the self and the distance it presupposes, on the one hand is a necessary condition for reflection and autonomy. On the other hand, the ego might go as far as to annihilate this distance, driven by the will to converge with its image. Normally, the ego is a necessary condition for the exploration of space: it opens up space by seeing ourselves reflected in other, virtual spaces. The imaginary object (the ideal form) that we seek is not simply out there in our natural environment but reflected in different kinds of virtual space (the mirror, art, the shopping mall, cyberspace …). So, our 'self-portrait' moves us (and it legitimizes actions: man as an astronaut for the exploration of outer space; man as a multiple personality for the exploration of cyberspace). Because I see myself as (beautiful, desirable, explorative, multiple etc) I define my sense of self and my actions. It is the virtual image that sustains desire, and I get anxious when I lose this image, or depressed when it is negative ("I am nothing, nobody wants me …"). This exploration of space can nevertheless transform into a domination of space. Lacan diagnoses science and technology as guided by such imaginary desires. This imaginary conquest of space can also seize upon man in the digital era (cf. the cyborg soldier). Virtual space then replaces real space: someone's life in cyberspace is no longer an exploration but a compensation. When life in cyberspace becomes such a hallucination (cyberspace itself as a consensual hallucination), there is no longer (enough) distance between the self and its image, and no space for (a symbolical, ethical, regulating, non-narcisstic) desire. Cyberspace needs a free subject of desire, one not wrapped up in it. Bibliography Barglow, R. (1994) The Crisis of the Self in the Age of Information (London/New York: Routledge). Bergoffen, D.B. 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